The porcupine dilemma: why US-China diplomacy is about distance, not deals

Arthur Schopenhauer’s classic parable of relationships may help us understand today’s China-US ties. The reclusive German philosopher famously described how wintering porcupines need to cluster together to survive the biting cold, but hurt one another with their quills if they get too close. In the end, the porcupines must learn to balance the need for shared warmth against the pain of pricking each other. Chinese President Xi Jinping received an unprecedentedly lavish reception from Donald Trump this week – one that would make America’s staunchest allies envious. On his second state visit to the US, a first for a Chinese president, Xi and his wife Peng Liyuan schmoozed with the American first couple like old friends. Both presidents heaped praise on one another and pledged to do more to further the friendship of the two peoples. They will meet again in Shenzhen and Miami before the year is out: three presidential summits in four months set another record. Yet the warmth between the two leaders could not conceal the tensions sizzling beneath. The fact that the two sides only agreed to extend the truce in their costly trade war by two more months, after an unscheduled, eleventh-hour negotiation ahead of the summit, is telling. Expectations for any breakthrough on critical minerals or chip controls are low. Observers also doubt whether Washington is willing to fundamentally shift its policy on Taiwan, even though Trump did postpone an approved arms sale and was careful about public comments on the issue, mindful of Beijing’s sensitivities. To some, the three-day summit seemed heavy on pageantry but light on substance. One former US diplomat called it “theatrical pageantry” that “papered over real problems”. Yet often in diplomacy – and especially in this case – form is substance. Protocols and rituals function in human society as a way of setting the right distance. It is unrealistic to expect the two sides to reach any substantial breakthrough, given the sharp spikes these two “porcupines” carry on their backs. While Xi was given the highest honours by his host, the trip was overshadowed by domestic American political turmoil and Trump’s feud with the mainstream media. Most Americans saw little footage of the actual summit, as major television networks did not provide live coverage – a consequence of Trump’s ban on CNN, MS Now and Politico from the White House. When the visit was covered, the narrative was often coloured by the networks’ anger at the president. Trump was relentlessly criticised by liberal media for warming up to Communist China, and the tirades against Beijing often bordered on hysteria. We are where we are because neither side could land a knockout punch, and both hold enough leverage to make the winter hard for the other The underlying sentiment seems to be that Washington simply needs to “act tough” to strong-arm Beijing into submission. That script has been tried before, and it has never worked. Before this week’s meeting, the US and China had already settled into nine years of intense rivalry, fighting trade wars, tech wars, financial wars and narrative wars. We are where we are because neither side could land a knockout punch, and both hold enough leverage to make the winter hard for the other. It is fitting, if ironic, that it’s Marco Rubio – still on Beijing’s sanctions list – who offers the sharpest rebuttal to that view, now wearing his Secretary of State hat. “The United States and China are the two largest economies in the world. The United States and China are probably the two most powerful militaries in the world. The relationship between the United States and China will define the 21st century,” Secretary Rubio said. “The idea that we would not interact with them at the highest levels is irresponsible. It’s outrageous. We have to. That doesn’t mean we don’t have strong disagreements. Of course, we do.” The present entente between China and the US is hardly, as some commentators believe, the result of Trump’s tendency to cosy up to authoritarian strongmen. The two sides are being driven together by the need for “shared warmth” in the face of pressing internal and external urgencies. Unlike the Soviet Union and the US during the Cold War, there is no Iron Curtain separating the two sides in today’s globalised world. For all the efforts to decouple or de-risk, Chinese and American national interests remain deeply intertwined. A study released by the Peterson Institute for International Economics last month found that despite all the tariffs and trade restrictions imposed on Beijing by Trump and his predecessor Joe Biden, China’s share of total value added in American imports dropped by only 2 per cent. Chinese supply chains remain deeply embedded in the American economy. At the same time, the need for cooperation on issues like the regulation of artificial intelligence – or “superintelligence” in President Trump’s terminology – is real and pressing. The danger of artificial intelligence lies not so much in machines replacing humans, but in the disproportionate power it hands to those with access to advanced AI over those without. That imbalance opens the door to every kind of abuse and misuse. It also sharply raises the risk of miscalculated nuclear warfare. During the Cold War, a strategic missile launched from Soviet or American soil would take roughly an hour to hit its target. Today, hypersonic technology has cut that window to under 20 minutes, and sophisticated stealth technology makes early detection far harder. Cold War-era generals had time to assess intelligence and call each other for clarification in an extreme emergency. Today, no human being can do all of that in 8 to 20 minutes. Inevitably, this may mean ceding control of the nuclear button to AI – unless the two sides can reach some comprehensive agreement first. These are just some of the cold realities both sides must face. No matter how much you dislike the “spiky porcupine” across the room, you have to learn how to get close enough to survive the winter. This, in a roundabout way, is my explanation of what Xi means by “strategic stability” between the two sides. The term, first raised last October when the two leaders met in Busan, South Korea, describes how China and the US might find the “Goldilocks distance” – close enough to cooperate, far enough to compete, without risking bringing down the house. Seen this way, the success of this week’s summit should not be measured by the deals signed or missed, but by whether the two sides have established the right distance to contain their differences and allow controlled cooperation – one step at a time.

The porcupine dilemma: why US-China diplomacy is about distance, not deals

.css-1c6uqr6{color:inherit;font-weight:inherit;font-size:inherit;font-family:inherit;line-height:inherit;overflow-wrap:break-word;}Xi and Trump’s latest summit shows the need for cooperation even as deep differences continue to shape ties between the two powers

Xi and Trump’s latest summit shows the need for cooperation even as deep differences continue to shape ties between the two powers