How Trump’s Venezuela strike humiliated Russia and worried China

US President Donald Trump’s actions in Venezuela and the kidnapping of the country’s president, Nicolas Maduro, have put Russia and China – widely considered two of Caracas’ most important international partners – in a difficult position. If they do not significantly reduce ties with the Latin American nation, they risk Washington’s retaliation. But who has more to lose, Moscow or Beijing? Unlike previous American leaders, Trump has not made any pretence about protecting democracy and human rights. In Venezuela, he has made it clear that his interests are primarily driven by energy. Reports suggest the Trump administration is demanding Venezuela partner exclusively with the United States on oil production and cut off ties with Russia and China, as well as Iran and Cuba. At first glance, this move could have a serious impact on Beijing, given that China is a major buyer of Venezuelan oil, but would it really? While around 80 per cent of Venezuelan oil was sent to China last year, that accounted for just 4 per cent of China’s total oil imports. The fact that oil prices fell despite US military actions in Venezuela suggests the global market does not see a threat of oil shortages. Thus, even if Caracas completely halts oil exports to China, Beijing can simply increase imports from other producers. Also working in Beijing’s favour is Trump’s statement that he might allow Venezuela to continue selling oil to China. Russia does not appear to be as fortunate. The US seizure of a Russian-flagged oil tanker on January 7 represents a serious blow to the Kremlin. Still bogged down by its invasion of Ukraine, Russia is not in a position to respond to Trump’s move, leaving pro-Kremlin propaganda in a difficult situation. For months, Kremlin envoy Kirill Dmitriev has praised Trump’s purported peace efforts in Ukraine, while Russian media have deemed the US president “Russia’s friend” who seeks to protect Moscow’s interests. Now, after he bombed Russia’s strategic partner and the US military seized a Russian oil tanker, Dmitriev and Kremlin-friendly analysts will have a hard time justifying Trump’s earlier stance as sympathetic towards Moscow. Trump has not only publicly humiliated Moscow by seizing the oil tanker, he has also inflicted a reputational blow on the Kremlin by capturing Maduro. Less than a month before the US incursion into Venezuela, Maduro spoke with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who reaffirmed his support for the Venezuelan government’s course. In November, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Chernyshenko called Venezuela Russia’s steadfast partner and ally. Yet, the Kremlin did nothing to protect its ally from the American military, which is a bad signal to the few remaining countries that still see Russia as a reliable security backer. Despite Chernyshenko’s language to the contrary, Russia and Venezuela were never formal allies. In May 2025, the two nations signed a treaty on strategic partnership and cooperation. Although it is not a mutual defence pact like Nato’s Article 5, it highlights that Russia and Venezuela will expand defence, energy and military-technical cooperation. Russia has a long history of providing arms to Venezuela. A Politico report suggests that Moscow has supplied nearly US$20 billion in military equipment to Caracas since 1999. By contrast, Venezuela bought just US$628 million in arms from China between 2000 and 2017, a drop in the ocean compared with Russia’s massive deliveries. More importantly, even though Beijing and Caracas established an “all-weather strategic partnership” in 2023, China – unlike Russia – has never labelled Venezuela as an ally. Instead, Beijing has focused on strengthening economic ties with Caracas. While the Russian-Venezuelan trade balance was rather modest at around US$200 million as of last May, bilateral trade between China and Venezuela reached roughly US$7 billion by the end of 2024. China has extended tens of billions of US dollars in loans to Venezuela over the years, most of which have been repaid in oil. Estimates suggest that Caracas still owes Beijing at least US$10 billion. It remains to be seen whether China will ever recover this money if the new Venezuelan authorities comply with Trump’s ultimatums. But despite a nominally lower trade balance, Russia seems to have more to lose if Venezuela’s interim President Delcy Rodriguez severs economic ties with Moscow. Russia provided a reported US$17 billion in loans to Venezuela between 2006 and 2019, money it might never be able to recoup. Fully aware of this, Russian policymakers appear to be employing the same strategy they used after the fall of their client Bashar al-Assad in Syria – swiftly attempting to establish ties with the country’s new authorities. Russian Ambassador to Venezuela Sergey Melik-Bagdasarov said on January 10 that Moscow stood in support and solidarity with the Venezuelan people and that the Treaty on Strategic Partnership and Cooperation between Russia and Venezuela remained the guiding framework for the development of bilateral relations. Will Venezuela’s new leadership really rely on a document that has proven to be a dead letter? One thing is for sure: Trump has demonstrated to Putin how a “special military operation” should look. At the same time, the stakes for China are clear: relying solely on economic ties with any country is unlikely to protect its geopolitical interests.

How Trump’s Venezuela strike humiliated Russia and worried China

.css-1c6uqr6{color:inherit;font-weight:inherit;font-size:inherit;font-family:inherit;line-height:inherit;overflow-wrap:break-word;}The US abduction of Venezuela’s president showed Russia could do little to protect its ally while China’s economic ties were put at risk

The US abduction of Venezuela’s president showed Russia could do little to protect its ally while China’s economic ties were put at risk