Taiwan might as well give up now

The United States does not care much about democracy in general or Taiwan’s democracy in particular. Defending the island’s political system is a fairy tale it and its allies tell others; their real intention has always been to prevent China’s reunification and contain its rise. In reality, the island is a key node in the so-called first island chain for defence, or rather, offence against mainland China. It serves as a convenient pawn in disguising US dominance as defence of democracy. But secessionists in Taiwan such as those from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party have bought into the American propaganda, or rather, they happily propagate the fairy tale themselves. Taiwan’s routine purchase of outdated American weapons is not really for war, but more of a bribe constantly demanded by Washington. The weapons are not even being delivered on time. Taipei needs to maintain the pretence of deterrence, knowing Beijing has other options and would avoid a military operation as far as possible. It’s increasingly clear that the US not only won’t defend the island, but might not even help in a real crisis. Interestingly, an increasing number of mainstream US media outlets are admitting this reality. The Atlantic’s Simon Shuster has reported from Taiwan on what the island is willing to do to avoid war with mainland China. After speaking with officials in Taiwan and Washington, he concluded that the Taiwanese don’t trust US President Donald Trump, they don’t believe America will come to their defence, and that a deal with mainland China is starting to look inevitable. Shuster reports that the US war with Iran has helped Cheng Li-wun, leader of the opposition Kuomintang, make the case that resisting mainland China would be futile – with even Cheng’s opponents acknowledging that the Iran war has left the US less ready to defend Taiwan. Visiting Taiwan this past spring, Shuster saw how little faith remained in the US as a force for stability and protection. “This loss of confidence has forced many in Taiwan to rethink their attitude toward China,” he observed. Both Cheng and Chinese President Xi Jinping have expressed willingness to negotiate on the basis of shared identity, free trade, economic bonds and peaceful coexistence. But as Shuster notes, the US still has an economic incentive to exercise deterrence: more than 90 per cent of the world’s most advanced chips are made in Taiwan – including those driving the AI revolution, which has propped up the American economy – and the US is determined to deny mainland China access to that crucial resource. Otherwise, the game is almost up for the island. Shared principles of freedom and democracy no longer count for much in this debate. When the subject came up in my interviews in Taipei and Washington, people seemed embarrassed to talk about American values, as if the idea were quaint Simon Shuster “Taiwan and its defenders struggle to explain why Americans should care enough about their cause to risk war with China,” Shuster wrote. “Shared principles of freedom and democracy no longer count for much in this debate. When the subject came up in my interviews in Taipei and Washington, people seemed embarrassed to talk about American values, as if the idea were quaint.” Instead, the more forceful argument for defending Taiwan came from those looking to exploit the island “as a platform to secure American dominance over the Pacific”. But the unravelling of Pax Americana has become obvious. “China’s allies in Taipei need only point to Trump’s prevarications as proof that the Americans cannot be trusted,” Shuster wrote. “That may be all Xi needs to take Taiwan without firing a shot.” Writing for Foreign Policy, columnist James Crabtree argues that Trump has killed “strategic ambiguity” over Taiwan. The immediate fear is that Trump might trade away Taiwan’s security during his coming summit with Xi, he wrote, undermining America’s long-standing posture of “strategic ambiguity”. Developed in the late 1970s, the idea has been to avoid stating whether the US would defend Taiwan militarily, thereby deterring mainland Chinese aggression while restraining Taiwanese provocation. Trump’s instincts threaten this balance. He views Taiwan with suspicion, complains it “stole” America’s semiconductor industry, and questions the idea of travelling “9,500 miles to fight a war”. His administration’s “constructive strategic stability” framework with Beijing implies that support for Taiwan should be managed carefully to preserve broader relations. Some Trump advisers explicitly argue against defending Taiwan. While officials insist the policy remains unchanged, Trump’s rhetoric and actions – including holding up a US$14 billion arms package as negotiating leverage – suggest a drift towards non-intervention. The charade of American deterrence is increasingly obvious. Reports that Trump rejected Saudi pleas to help strike the Houthis in Yemen could only reinforce Taipei’s scepticism about Washington’s defence commitments. Taipei should reorient its stance, distance itself from the US, and approach Beijing with humility and goodwill with a view to reaching a final satisfactory settlement of its constitutional status within China.

Taiwan might as well give up now

.css-1c6uqr6{color:inherit;font-weight:inherit;font-size:inherit;font-family:inherit;line-height:inherit;overflow-wrap:break-word;}If Washington can’t or won’t defend the island, Taipei has no choice but to settle with Beijing

If Washington can’t or won’t defend the island, Taipei has no choice but to settle with Beijing