East Asia’s crisis of confidence in the US is militarising China’s backyard

The dust and debris of the US-Israeli war on Iran have yet to settle, but its strategic shock waves have reached East Asia. From Tokyo to Taipei, a reassessment is under way. The conflict, intended to project American resolve, has been a brutal stress test for the US-led order – with catastrophic results for Washington’s credibility. Far from cementing its primacy, America’s misadventure has revealed a superpower that is overstretched, vulnerable and seen as an unreliable partner. This erosion of strength does not simplify Asia’s landscape; it incubates a more volatile environment that may paradoxically worsen China’s external security. The immediate lesson is one of brutal inequity. While China absorbs the economic tremors with its strategic depth and diversified energy arteries, America’s treaty allies in the region, Japan and South Korea, bear the brunt of the economic fallout. Meanwhile, its security guarantee now resembles a dangerous liability. Iran’s ability to strike US bases has made abstract threats concrete. If a sanctioned regional power can penetrate US defences, what would confrontation with China, a major missile power, mean for Tokyo or Seoul? Hosting US forces could turn into an invitation for obliteration. This crisis of confidence arrives as regional military trajectories are at an inflection point. In the face of a rising China and a nuclear-armed North Korea, US-aligned powers are not idle. Japan is shedding its post-war constraints, developing long-range anti-ship missiles and hypersonic glide vehicles that can strike over 1,000km away, clearly with Taiwan and the Chinese mainland in mind. With an emboldened North Korea and a distracted United States, Seoul’s need for self-reliance is urgent. It has fielded the “monster missile” Hyunmoo-5, a “bunker buster” with a 3,000km range, signalling an independent deterrent. Taiwan, though more limited, pours resources into anti-ship missiles designed to break a potential blockade. The US struggle to conclude the war further fuels these programmes. The war laid bare critical US weaknesses: depleted munitions stocks, an anaemic industrial base and the need to divert resources from the Pacific. The myth of invincibility is shattered. Consequently, the logic for Tokyo, Seoul and Taipei shifts from supporting a US-led coalition to preparing to go it alone – or holding the line until a distracted and depleted America can arrive. The now leaky US security umbrella incentivises allies to forge their own steel. This march towards regional armament is the first and most dangerous potential outcome for China. A fully remilitarised Japan, a nuclear-capable South Korea and a better-armed Taiwan would deteriorate China’s peripheral security, creating a multi-front missile threat and locking the region into a hair-trigger security dilemma. Yet, the US quagmire in Iran suggests a second path: hedging and accommodation. Given the risk of hosting US assets, some capitals may distance themselves from Washington’s confrontational stance. They could pursue more economic cooperation with China, expand diplomatic channels and avoid aligning with US actions that provoke Beijing. The goal is to avoid being the battlefield where giants clash. This forces them into a strategic split personality: arming to the teeth while talking peace – a blend of deterrence and diplomatic appeasement. Such a strategy could manifest in declined requests for new US missile deployments, high-profile overtures to Beijing or a softening of rhetoric on contentious regional issues. China faces a complex strategic puzzle. Its response will shape the dominant path. One option is a grand bargain with Washington. The coming summit between President Xi Jinping and President Donald Trump could forge a mutual understanding: the US would maintain a reduced presence to prevent a runaway arms race. The complication is Taiwan. It is Beijing’s absolute red line. Any perception that Washington is indulging Taipei’s separatist ambitions or enhancing military integration with the island would torpedo any US-China understanding and force a hardened Chinese posture. Thus, China’s optimal strategy is a dual-track approach: maintaining unwavering focus and relentless pressure for reunification while working to keep East Asia stable. This means using diplomacy and economic leverage to discourage Japan and South Korea from crossing nuclear thresholds or forming an anti-China bloc, even as it monitors and counters their military upgrades. The fallout from the Persian Gulf has altered the game. Allies now stare into an abyss, forced to choose between the perils of dependence and the perils of an arms race. For China, any schadenfreude at America’s misfortune would be unwise. A region where allies lose faith in Washington is not necessarily a region that embraces Beijing; it is a region more likely to reach for its own guns. The greatest danger for China may be a fractious, nuclearised and terrified neighbourhood – a monster of America’s creation living squarely on China’s doorstep. Rather than celebrate the decline of US credibility, it has to manage the explosive uncertainty the decline unleashed. This signals that China’s role must evolve: from the classic posture of “sitting on a mountain to watch the tigers fight”, it must help create an environment that prevents the tigers in its neighbourhood from turning on each other, or on it. This shift is evident in initiatives like the recent China-Pakistan five-point peace plan for the Gulf, calling for an immediate ceasefire, dialogue and safeguarding maritime channels. The art of “managing uncertainty” is the first practice of a new craft: not just observing the fray, but taming it.

East Asia’s crisis of confidence in the US is militarising China’s backyard

.css-1c6uqr6{color:inherit;font-weight:inherit;font-size:inherit;font-family:inherit;line-height:inherit;overflow-wrap:break-word;}A region where US allies lose faith in Washington won’t necessarily embrace Beijing; it is a region more likely to reach for its own guns

A region where US allies lose faith in Washington won’t necessarily embrace Beijing; it is a region more likely to reach for its own guns