As denuclearisation stalls, China will shape stability on Korean peninsula

At the recent South Korea-China summit, both sides agreed to improve dialogue, rebuild trust and promote regional peace and stability, marking a first step towards a normalisation of relations. While the Beijing meeting produced no concrete agreement for peace on the Korean peninsula, it reaffirmed the peninsula’s stability and peace as a common interest – paving the way for cooperation. The prolonged stalemate over North Korea’s nuclear programme is no longer just a diplomatic impasse. The Korean peninsula stands at a critical juncture that will determine the future of northeast Asia’s security order. Renewed debate in Japan over nuclear options, alongside strengthened US-Japan extended deterrence, has made it increasingly difficult to treat the issue as one confined to Pyongyang. Regional actors are recalculating their strategic assumptions – with implications that extend well beyond the peninsula. As sanctions and pressure fail to produce progress on North Korea’s denuclearisation, crisis management has emerged as a more immediate and realistic challenge. North Korea has publicised advances in its nuclear-powered submarine programme, staged provocative military activities near the demilitarised zone and, around the time of the summit, launched ballistic missiles, reinforcing a sense of strategic uncertainty. Seoul’s recent declaration on pursuing a “nuclear-free Korean peninsula” signals a critical turning point. Shifts are also visible in the foreign and security priorities of Washington and Beijing. North Korea’s nuclear issue received only minimal attention in the 2025 US National Security Strategy, while references to denuclearisation on the Korean peninsula have disappeared from China’s latest arms control white paper. As the Taiwan Strait rises to the top of the strategic agenda, the North Korean nuclear issue appears to have moved down the list. Some argue this stalemate opens a strategic window of opportunity for North Korea. But possessing nuclear capabilities does not translate into international recognition as a nuclear-weapons state, nor does it make sanctions relief more likely. If the denuclearisation stalemate persists, repercussions will spill across the region. Renewed debate in Japan over nuclear options, combined with intensified military activity, risks shaking East Asia’s security landscape. Such developments would directly undermine South Korean and Chinese security interests, while placing additional pressure on China to commit greater diplomatic and strategic resources to northeast Asia. In this context, South Korea’s proposal for a nuclear-free Korean peninsula warrants closer scrutiny. As a policy goal, it does not presuppose immediate denuclearisation. Instead, it raises the question of whether managing nuclear risks within a more controlled and predictable framework could create a way out of the impasse. The Korean peninsula has precedent: in 1991, North and South Korea agreed to the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. Seoul’s approach carries two important implications. First, it clarifies the desired end state for the peninsula, signalling continuity with the declaration. Second, it suggests a more pragmatic way of thinking about denuclearisation – one that focuses less on pressure alone and more on managing nuclear use risks and preventing proliferation as conditions for longer-term progress. This is not a message aimed solely at North Korea, but one that also speaks to the shared interest of regional actors in containing the costs of instability. At the summit, President Xi Jinping said both countries “shoulder important responsibilities in maintaining regional peace and promoting global development, and share broad common interests”. It offered an insight into Beijing’s view of the North Korean issue and peninsula stability. Regardless of the denuclearisation progress, crisis management has emerged as a central concern. The key issue is how inter-Korean tensions are managed, as conditions for stability must be established before denuclearisation is reached. In a prolonged stalemate, the success or failure of such crisis management is closely tied to the stability of inter-Korean relations. Even a limited stability – one that contains military confrontation and prevents the spread of instability – could provide the minimum foundation needed to move towards a more sustainable peace on the peninsula. Both South Korea and China have already agreed to strengthen existing diplomatic and security consultation channels and maintain close communication through regular high-level strategic dialogue. What is unfolding can be understood as the beginning of a second round of the North Korean nuclear crisis. If the first round centred on sanctions-driven efforts for denuclearisation, the second is increasingly about managing nuclear risks to prevent wider instability across the peninsula and northeast Asia. This demands strategic judgment from all regional actors. Expectations are growing for South Korea to play a bridging role, using its diplomatic capacity to connect the interests of the United States, China and North Korea. Denuclearisation may have stalled but the principle that a nuclear-free Korean peninsula should be the end state has not changed. That outcome aligns closely with China’s long-term security interests. As the security environment in northeast Asia becomes more volatile, the summit has become a test of whether new strategic momentum can be generated – not merely as a diplomatic event but as a strategic turning point. The meeting between Xi and South Korea President Lee Jae Myung did not restart the stalled efforts for denuclearisation. But it clarified a more fundamental reality: as long as the nuclear stalemate persists, the task of managing nuclear risks and preventing regional instability will only grow more urgent. China’s choices will prove decisive in determining whether northeast Asia moves towards greater stability – or deeper strategic fragmentation.

As denuclearisation stalls, China will shape stability on Korean peninsula

.css-1c6uqr6{color:inherit;font-weight:inherit;font-size:inherit;font-family:inherit;line-height:inherit;overflow-wrap:break-word;}South Korean leader’s Beijing visit makes clear need to manage inter-Korean tensions and establish stability en route to denuclearisation

South Korean leader’s Beijing visit makes clear need to manage inter-Korean tensions and establish stability en route to denuclearisation