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Xinlu Liang

A new Chinese law that pledges to hold overseas individuals and organisations responsible for undermining ethnic unity is mainly intended to have a “deterrent effect”, according to analysts.
The Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress was passed in March and is set to take effect next month, with Article 63 at the heart of the controversy about targeting people outside China.
The law provides a new framework which analysts said was designed to counter Western ideological influence and provide a statutory mandate for assimilating minority groups.
They added that even if it proved hard to enforce overseas, its main weapon was psychological and political pressure.
“The significance of Article 63 lies less in its immediate enforceability abroad than in its deterrent effect,” said Peter T.C. Chang, a research associate at the Malaysia-China Friendship Association and former deputy director of the Institute of China Studies at the University of Malaya.
“Beijing is signalling that support for what it defines as ethnic separatism will no longer be treated as a purely domestic matter.”
Ryan Mitchell, an associate law professor at Chinese University of Hong Kong, said enforcing the law would face steep hurdles if foreign governments refused extradition requests, particularly for what they viewed as political offences.
“The new article will be very unlikely to alter such considerations by other states,” Mitchell said.
Because of this, the immediate impact is likely to be a profound chilling effect on civil society and academia.
James Leibold, a specialist in China’s ethnic politics and professor emeritus at Melbourne’s La Trobe University, warned that because “undermining ethnic unity” remained a broad political category, the law would inevitably discourage debates and warn “overseas communities that criticism of China’s ethnic policies may carry personal and transnational costs”.


According to Wang Jiangyu, a law professor at City University of Hong Kong, the provision served mainly as a “deterrent and signalling mechanism” for overseas separatist groups.
He added that the impact on minority diaspora communities would depend heavily on how broadly their conduct was interpreted.
It may also contribute to “legal and diplomatic friction” with foreign governments, particularly where “competing jurisdictional claims arise”.
Using Malaysia – which hosts a “small but visible” Uygur diaspora including students and asylum seekers – as an example, Chang warned that governments might soon face uncomfortable requests that would require them to weigh up the importance of maintaining their friendly relations with Beijing and protecting their judicial sovereignty.
“This could make Malaysia an important testing ground for the practical limits of Beijing’s new extraterritorial provisions,” he said.
Barry Sautman, a specialist in China’s ethnic minorities and professor emeritus at Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, said there would probably be few prosecutions under Article 63, largely because the potential targets were unlikely to “put themselves under the jurisdiction of the Chinese state”.
Responding to Western criticisms branding the law as “extraterritorial overreach”, vice-minister of justice Hu Weilie said on Wednesday that Article 63 was a “normal exercise” of state sovereignty compliant with international practice.
“Every country possesses the inherent right to pass domestic legislation preventing secessionist activities,” Hu said, adding that the law targeted specific illegal acts and “will not interfere with routine international academic, cultural or economic cooperation”.
Some analysts have argued that applying the law will prove difficult because it is too broad and vague, but they said it was grounded in international legal concepts such as protective jurisdiction.
This allows a sovereign state to claim jurisdiction over a crime committed outside its borders by a non-citizen if that crime threatens the state’s vital national interests.
Wang also pointed to other widely recognised international legal doctrines, such as those giving states the right to prosecute their own nationals regardless of where they are.
“There is nothing inherently unlawful about asserting jurisdiction in this manner, provided there is a sufficient connecting factor and enforcement is exercised within accepted limits,” Wang said.
Sautman said the clause was not an example of “long-arm jurisdiction” but aligned with legal doctrines such as protective jurisdiction and the “objective territorial principle”, which grants states the right to prosecute external acts that harm their internal security.
The law did not create entirely new powers, but “merely provides a legal basis for practices long in effect in China” over the past two decades, such as issuing entry bans or placing economic pressure on foreign companies and individuals who backed separatist rhetoric on Taiwan, Xinjiang, or Tibet, he said.
Beijing regards Taiwan as part of its territory and has never renounced the use of force to bring it under its control.
Most countries, including the island’s main international partner the United States, do not recognise Taiwan as an independent state, although Washington opposes any attempt to take the island by force.
Mitchell said Article 63 departed from traditional concepts of protective jurisdiction, which requires something to be illegal in both countries.
“Even though the law containing it is not a criminal statute, it could have an effect by broadening the definition of illegal conduct to more clearly include speech or other activity that Beijing views as ‘sabotaging ethnic unity and progress’,” he said.
While such acts were covered domestically under criminal codes such as Article 103 on “undermining national unification”, they rarely had corresponding statutes abroad.
But the new law suggested protective jurisdiction “could be invoked regardless”, Mitchell added.

He also said Article 63 could be paired with China’s expanding “non-criminal sanctions” regime, allowing Beijing to impose administrative or financial penalties against foreign actors for overseas conduct deemed harmful to ethnic unity.
Observers said the new law reflected a broader effort by Beijing to counter foreign pressure by deploying a comprehensive “legal warfare” framework to institutionalise its sovereignty claims even if physical enforcement remained out of reach.
The most significant aspect of the new clause was not its existence, but China’s “changing attitude” towards extraterritorial jurisdiction, Wang said.
“Historically, China has been relatively cautious in exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction,” he said. “However, recent developments suggest a gradual shift towards a more proactive and institutionalised approach, especially in areas linked to sovereignty, national security, and political integrity.”


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News

China

Politics

The legislation, which comes into effect next month, is seen as a way for Beijing to exert psychological pressure on diaspora communities


The legislation, which comes into effect next month, is seen as a way for Beijing to exert psychological pressure on diaspora communities.


Xinjiang

Tibet

What Beijing hopes to achieve with new ethnic unity law that targets people overseas

.css-1c6uqr6{color:inherit;font-weight:inherit;font-size:inherit;font-family:inherit;line-height:inherit;overflow-wrap:break-word;}The legislation, which comes into effect next month, is seen as a way for Beijing to exert psychological pressure on diaspora communities

The legislation, which comes into effect next month, is seen as a way for Beijing to exert psychological pressure on diaspora communities