Why China and Vietnam are shifting from confrontation to calm in South China Sea claims

Despite land reclamation efforts in the fiercely contested South China Sea, an unusual silence has fallen between Beijing and Hanoi over their rival claims. Observers said this suggested both sides were prioritising pragmatism to keep tensions in check. In March, months into reports suggesting continued Chinese dredging activities at Antelope Reef in the Paracel Islands, Hanoi broke its silence by lodging a protest with Beijing over what it called “illegal and invalid” foreign activities. “Vietnam resolutely opposes such activities, makes representations and affirms its position on this matter,” Vietnamese foreign ministry spokeswoman Pham Thu Hang said in a statement on March 21. Without mentioning Antelope Reef, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Lin Jian said the next day that the “construction” carried out in the Paracels was “aimed at improving the living conditions of the islands’ residents and serving local economic development”. This approach appears consistent with how maritime disputes between the two have played out over the past few years. China has so far reacted to Vietnam’s recent island-building activities in the disputed Spratly Islands only with official verbal complaints, rather than stronger actions. The Spratlys – known as the Nansha Islands in China – are also claimed by Vietnam, as well as the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. The restraint contrasts sharply with the fierce exchanges between China and the Philippines over contested South China Sea features, with repeated clashes between their coastguards and naval vessels raising fears of a wider conflict that could pull in the United States, a Philippine treaty ally. Observers said that while China and Vietnam had not changed their positions on territorial claims, they appeared to be taking a pragmatic approach. According to Zhu Feng, dean of the school of international studies at Nanjing University, maintaining stability is a priority for Beijing in its South China Sea policy, running in “a very sophisticated parallel” with maintaining its sovereignty in the disputed waters. The two approaches were “mutually interconnected”, Zhu said. If China were to push strongly and take military action against Vietnam’s island-building activities in the Spratlys, “then its South China Sea policy would be about asserting sovereignty, without maintaining stability”, he added. The restraint also reflected China’s “strategic pragmatism”, Zhu said, particularly in managing ties with neighbours – now a priority on Beijing’s foreign policy agenda to counter pressure from the US. For decades, China has been Vietnam’s biggest trading partner – and the relationship has been pivotal to Beijing’s overall ties with other member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. “China is in the process of a power rise, and you can’t simply act rashly but have to maintain strategic pragmatism,” Zhu said. “If you make enemies everywhere, you’ll instead give the US and Japan more opportunities.” Carlyle Thayer, a Southeast Asia specialist and emeritus professor at the University of New South Wales, said Beijing could also be trying to concentrate on Manila in its South China Sea claims. “Opening a second front with Vietnam would detract from China’s focus on the Philippines,” Thayer said. “China knows that too heavy a hand against Vietnam would provoke domestic anti-China sentiment that would complicate ongoing engagement activities with Vietnam, such as Chinese involvement in high-speed rail connectivity across their border with Vietnam.” Citing satellite imagery, American news magazine Newsweek reported in January that new sand dredging began at Antelope Reef – known as Lingyang Jiao in China and Da Hai Sam in Vietnam – around October last year. It was unclear when Vietnam lodged its protest, but days before the statement from its foreign ministry, Hanoi hosted the first-ever ministerial meeting with China that involved senior officials overseeing foreign policy, defence and public security. According to Beijing, during the “3+3” summit, Chinese Defence Minister Dong Jun called on the two sides to “jointly safeguard maritime security and stability through positive interaction”. Meanwhile, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stressed the importance of “properly addressing maritime issues so as to create a more favourable international environment for the development of each country”. China’s construction activities in the Paracels have typically drawn quick condemnation from Vietnam. These have included the opening of a hotpot restaurant, a hardware store and a shopping centre on Woody Island, China’s administrative hub for the vast South China Sea. Beijing took full control of the Paracels – known as the Xisha Islands in China and the Hoang Sa Islands in Vietnam – in 1974. Thayer said the sustained exchange of high-level visits and working-level discussions could drive the two sides to work out “a modus vivendi” or practical arrangement on their maritime disputes. Since an intense stand-off over a Chinese oil rig near the Paracels in 2014 and a brief face-off near Vanguard Bank in the Spratlys in 2019, Beijing and Hanoi have managed to mend political ties without playing up their maritime disputes. In 2022, Nguyen Phu Trong, then-general secretary of Vietnam’s ruling Communist Party, became the first foreign leader to visit Beijing after President Xi Jinping secured his third term as China’s Communist Party leader. The leaders of the two countries have remained engaged since. Xi paid a reciprocal visit to Hanoi in 2023, while in 2024, Vietnamese leader To Lam visited Beijing for his first foreign trip after succeeding Trong just weeks earlier. Last year, when economies in Southeast Asia, including Vietnam, were under threat from US President Donald Trump’s so-called Liberation Day tariffs, Lam rolled out the red carpet for Xi, and the two sides signed 45 cooperation agreements in sectors ranging from supply chains and artificial intelligence to joint maritime patrols and railway development. Thayer said: “As a result of exchanges by party leaders over recent years, there has been an acknowledgement by both sides that maritime disputes in the South China Sea are the main irritant in bilateral relations. “There is also consensus that maritime disputes should not hold hostage the development of their bilateral relations.” Thayer added that Beijing might also be biding its time until Vietnam’s leadership transition played out following the country’s 14th party congress in January. A new National Assembly elected in March is expected to confirm the next state leadership this month, amid speculation that To will concurrently serve as state president. Nguyen Khac Giang, an analyst at Singapore’s ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, said Vietnam’s delayed protest over China’s land reclamation on Antelope Reef might also reflect Hanoi’s thinking in its territorial disputes with Beijing. “Hanoi has historically calibrated its response between quiet diplomacy and open protest depending on context: the severity of the action, the state of the broader relationship and what it believes it can extract through private channels,” he said. “The delayed public protest on Antelope Reef, for example, likely reflects this. Hanoi was working the issue bilaterally before deciding the diplomatic track needed public reinforcement.” Giang said the warming relationship alongside both countries’ intensifying reclamation illustrated “a fundamental reality” for Vietnam. “Hanoi can deepen engagement with Beijing while pushing back on its maritime claims at the same time. I think this is the operating logic of a smaller power managing an asymmetric relationship.” Zhu said the land reclamation at Antelope Reef could be Beijing’s response to Hanoi’s island-building in the Spratlys. “However, Vietnam is not acting like the Philippines, and the restraint was also reciprocal.”

Why China and Vietnam are shifting from confrontation to calm in South China Sea claims

.css-1c6uqr6{color:inherit;font-weight:inherit;font-size:inherit;font-family:inherit;line-height:inherit;overflow-wrap:break-word;}Disagreements continue, but the two sides are showing notable restraint in contrast with Beijing’s fierce exchanges with Manila

Disagreements continue, but the two sides are showing notable restraint in contrast with Beijing’s fierce exchanges with Manila