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Kawala Xie

Last month’s Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) defence meeting served not only as a curtain-raiser for the bloc’s summit in the autumn, but also as a test of Beijing’s broader ambition to promote a Global South-empowered multipolar world order.
Like Brics – the grouping of developing countries established by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – the Global South-oriented SCO is a showcase for China’s home-ground diplomacy.
Beijing has increasingly relied on these platforms to denounce hegemony and unilateralism while presenting itself as a defender of the Global South and emphasising its shared identity with the group.
However, the SCO and Brics require consensus in their decision-making, a rule that often highlights another contender for leadership of the Global South and a fellow member of both organisations – India.
When defence chiefs from the 10 SCO member states gathered in June at Qingdao, in the eastern province of Shandong, it was the first visit to China by India’s Rajnath Singh since the deadly clash between Indian and Chinese troops in the Galwan Valley in 2020.
It was also the first time that senior ministers from India and Pakistan had shared a stage since their conflict in May, which followed an attack in Kashmir that killed dozens of Indian tourists, with New Delhi accusing Islamabad of supporting those responsible.
The defence ministers were unable to adopt a joint statement at the end of their discussions because of a lack of consensus over its language on terrorism, according to the Indian foreign ministry.

The statement reportedly omitted reference to the April attack in Kashmir while including references to militant activity in Pakistan’s Balochistan province, where India is accused of backing separatist militants that are targeting Pakistani and Chinese interests.
Beijing did not comment on the reported disagreement and described the meeting as a success, but some Indian media outlets claimed that China – as this year’s chair – had allowed biased language to be included in the statement, disregarding India’s concerns.
Observers noted that India’s refusal to endorse the joint declaration highlighted the deep-seated divisions within China-backed regional blocs while underscoring the limitations of the Global South solidarity that Beijing has long championed.
India also refused to back China’s Belt and Road Initiative during an SCO virtual summit chaired by New Delhi in 2023, leaving the bloc’s economic development strategy to 2030 unsigned because of its echo of the massive infrastructure plan.
Zhang Jiadong, director of Fudan University’s Centre for South Asian Studies, said India’s refusal to back the latest SCO joint statement on defence underscored the difficulty of China and India cooperating within such platforms.
The result was a weakening of the effectiveness of these groups and also of Beijing’s broader strategy to unify the Global South, according to Zhang.
“Whether it’s in the SCO or Brics, China and India are major powers that emphasise strategic autonomy, so their cooperation in these organisations is naturally limited,” he said.
“China and India are the most important countries in terms of population and economy in the Global South … Without their cooperation on global issues, the group is unlikely to achieve much.”


Amit Ranjan, a China-India relations expert at the National University of Singapore, said that both China and India aspired to lead the Global South, but separately.
The two countries had disputes over some of their bilateral issues and perceived most global affairs differently, according to Ranjan. Further, there were broader divisions within the heterogeneous Global South over important political issues, he said.
“In principle, most of the countries condemn any form of terrorism. But they did not come out in support of India against Pakistan after the Pahalgam terror attack. That was a big test for … India’s foreign policy,” Ranjan said.
“There’s a division within the Global South on many issues … but an important issue is how to lead this Global South. That remains a problem even for China.”
India is also seeking to position itself as the voice of the Global South, invoking a shared colonial past and advancing targeted economic partnerships with Africa and Southeast Asia to counter China’s expanding presence through the belt and road plan.
Since 2023, India has hosted Voice of the Global South summits, attended by more than 100 nations. The platform is designed for non-G20 countries, with the result that China is excluded.
Srikanth Kondapalli, an international relations professor at New Delhi’s Jawaharlal Nehru University, said that both India and China were pushing for the unity of the Global South, but “their approaches and tactics differ”.
While Beijing had achieved greater success in trade and investment through the belt and road programme, it had also drawn criticism for raising debt levels in African nations, Kondapalli observed.
Meanwhile, India had taken a more moderate path – launching alternative initiatives like the International Solar Alliance and Digital Public Infrastructure, despite its relatively limited trade and investment footprint in the Global South, he said.
“China pushed [the] Beijing Consensus while India the Mumbai Consensus. What is important is that China and Indian competition in [the] Global South created opportunities for these countries.”




Beijing has repeatedly denied accusations that its belt and road loans in Africa are a trap, pointing out that multilateral institutions and Western private lenders hold the largest share of the continent’s debt.
China has also highlighted its efforts in helping Zambia to restructure its debts, while forgiving interest-free loans for 17 African countries.
According to Min Ye, an international relations professor at Boston University, tensions between China and India were to be expected as they pursued leadership and influence among the Global South.
But such tensions were a “manifestation of peaceful coexistence” rather than “us versus them conflicts”, she added.
“Much to China’s dislike, India has opposed initiatives China put forward in organisations such as the SCO and Brics … While disappointing for China, this outcome is not unexpected and highlights that the SCO provides space for regional rivalry.”
Ye added that the purpose of such regional organisations was to foster dialogue and communicate disagreements.
She noted that they served as “symbols and evidence of China’s multilateral leadership”, enhancing its global image and authority, and were “not a panacea [nor a] guaranteed strategy” for any member state.
“China cannot unite the Global South, given its differences, interests, and alignments,” Ye said, adding that it could play a positive leadership role to facilitate multilateral exchange and allow disagreements, like those between India and Pakistan.


Niu Haibin, director of the Institute of Foreign Policy Studies at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, noted that past initiatives involving India but excluding China had gained limited global traction.
The US-led Summit for Democracy and the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum were framed as alliances of like-minded democracies and involved many Global South nations but not China.
Such initiatives have been met with a wary eye from Beijing, which has often criticised the forming of such blocs as inciting ideological confrontations.
“The most representative and effective international forums today are not mainly based on ideological consistency,” Niu said. “I think Global South countries also see this very clearly – it’s a group defined by diversity indeed.”
Niu acknowledged that India and China remained at odds on issues such as the Brics currency proposals, but said this had not necessarily obstructed China from advancing its core agendas.
India is opposed to proposals for a common Brics currency, an initiative championed by Beijing and Moscow as an alternative to the US dollar amid their growing tensions with Washington.




US President Donald Trump has threatened tariffs against the Brics countries if they go ahead with the initiative. Despite a lack of consensus over a common currency, China has increased the use of yuan in trade with the Brics members, including India.
“India’s monetary policy within the Brics mechanism may be relatively limited to accommodate the concerns of the United States,” Niu said. “But this isn’t harmful. While such cooperation is welcome, its absence won’t hinder the organisation’s progress.”
According to Niu, China should not be too ambitious to achieve immediate breakthroughs over certain policy goals within the multilateral platforms.
“This is a gradual process – one that depends on building strategic trust, deepening exchanges, and strengthening economic ties. As that trust grows, cooperation will follow naturally.”
Zhang from Fudan University cautioned that the Global South itself was no more than a concept, making it hard for any country to materialise or institutionalise.
“[It] reflects a desire among these countries to pursue a new identity and think beyond the current system. [But] whoever’s idea about the Global South gains broader international acceptance will ultimately hold greater influence,” he said.


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As Beijing promotes a multipolar world order based on empowered developing countries, New Delhi also views itself as a leader


As Beijing promotes a multipolar world order based on empowered developing countries, New Delhi also views itself as a leader.


Can India block China’s leadership in Global South-based alliances like the SCO?

.css-1c6uqr6{color:inherit;font-weight:inherit;font-size:inherit;font-family:inherit;line-height:inherit;overflow-wrap:break-word;}As Beijing promotes a multipolar world order based on empowered developing countries, New Delhi also views itself as a leader

As Beijing promotes a multipolar world order based on empowered developing countries, New Delhi also views itself as a leader