US-China conflict resolution needs more than a latter-day Nixon going to Beijing

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s long-delayed trip to Beijing has come and gone. Despite the predictable optimistic spin on the visit – both sides agreed to strengthen people-to-people exchanges and promised to continue talks – it did little to defuse the increasingly fraught conflict between the United States and China.

The failure to re-establish military-to-military communications is especially worrisome given the recent near-collisions between the two superpowers’ warships in the Taiwan Strait and aircraft over the South China Sea. This is to say nothing of reported Chinese surveillance activity in Cuba, which bears an eerie resemblance to the events that precipitated the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 – one of the most frightening moments of the Cold War. The risks of accidental conflict remain high.

The underlying problem is overreliance on personalised diplomacy. Yes, that played a crucial role in the early days of the US-China relationship. More than just stagecraft, US president Richard Nixon’s historic trip to China in 1972 was a decisive strategic gambit aimed at the triangulation of the Soviet Union. Multiple layers of personal connections helped to tip the balance of power in the Cold War: Nixon and Mao Zedong at the top, underpinned by Henry Kissinger and Zhou Enlai working out the details of US-China engagement.